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TREATING A CHRONIC CASE OF DISCRIMINATION: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S PRESCRIPTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PATIENTS’ RIGHTS IN HARLICK v.
BLUE SHIELD
MEGAN LAGRECA*
“In a society where millions must hide debilitating diseases for fear of
prejudice, where potentially life-saving health care is routinely denied to
a disfavored class, where states have policies requiring parents to give
up custody of mentally ill children as a condition of treating them,
there are plenty of opportunities to strike a blow for justice.  At the
heart of this cause is ‘mental health parity’ legislation to end health in-
surance discrimination against those with mental illness.”1
I. PREEXISTING CONDITIONS: MENTAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
In June 1999, Anna Westin was diagnosed with anorexia.2  At the time
of her diagnosis, Anna weighed eighty-two pounds, had an abnormal echo-
cardiogram, a malfunctioning liver, and a below normal body tempera-
ture.3  Anna’s doctor ordered hospitalization, but told the Westins they
would need their insurance company to certify the treatment.4  Anna’s
mother thought “it was just a matter of a phone call.”5  Anna’s insurance
company paid for a two-day hospital stay, then informed Anna that “her
treatment was no longer medically necessary[,] and they would not pay
any additional costs.”6  Unable to receive treatment, Anna Westin contin-
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014.  This Note is
dedicated to the memories of Joseph and Helen Lagreca, who taught me the
importance of hard work and perseverance.  None of this would have been
possible without the support of my friends and family, especially John and Barbara
Smith, who continue to teach me the importance of having strength in one’s
convictions. Lastly, I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Villanova Law
Review, especially Megan Pownall and Kathleen Dapper, whose insights and
comments were integral to the completion of this article.
1. Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental
Health Care, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 364 (2004) (footnote omitted).
2. See Kitty Westin, When Your Child Dies of an Eating Disorder: A Mother’s Story,
EATING DISORDERS COALITION (June 13, 2002), http://www.eatingdisorderscoali-
tion.org/congbriefings/061302/housebriefing061302.html#westin (recounting
story of daughter’s anorexia before Congress).
3. See id. (describing medical complications from anorexia nervosa).
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ued to suffer from anorexia and ultimately committed suicide at her home
on February 17, 2000, when she was twenty-one years old.7
Almost two thousand miles away in San Mateo, California, Jeanene
Harlick had been suffering from anorexia for over twenty years.8  In 2006,
Jeanene checked into Castlewood Treatment Center in St. Louis, Mis-
souri.9  At the time of her admission, she was thirty-five percent below her
ideal body weight and had to use a feeding tube to receive vital nutri-
ents.10  When Blue Shield of California refused to cover her treatment at
Castlewood, Jeanene’s parents borrowed hundreds of thousands of dollars
against their home to pay for the treatment.11  After suing Blue Shield in
district court, the Ninth Circuit held in a landmark ruling that California’s
Mental Health Parity Act (“Parity Act”) required insurance companies to
cover medically necessary treatments for severe mental illnesses even if the
plan excluded such coverage.12
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Parity
Act correctly addresses the case-specific needs of mental health patients
and allows physicians to pursue all medically necessary treatment without a
concern that the patient’s insurance company may deny such care.13  Part
II provides an overview of mental health parity legislation since the intro-
duction of managed care organizations into the American health care sys-
tem, focusing on the federal system’s early statutory framework.14  Part III
examines the history and text of the Parity Act, and discusses the state and
federal courts’ interpretations of it.15  Part IV discusses the facts of the
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Harlick v. Blue Shield of California16 and
7. See id. (testifying to Congress on family struggles with anorexia).
8. See Andrew Pollack, Eating Disorders a New Front in Insurance Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A1 (discussing legal battles arising from insurance compa-
nies’ denials of residential treatment for anorexia).
9. See id. (providing background of Jeanene Harlick’s claims against insurance
company).
10. Id. (explaining Harlick’s medical status at time of admission to residential
treatment center).
11. See id. (acknowledging financial hardships caused by expenses of residen-
tial treatment when coverage is denied by insurers).
12. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing that all non-exempt California insurance plans must cover medically necessary
treatments for severe mental illnesses even if plan excluded such coverage).
13. See Victoria Colliver, Eating-Disorder Patients Battle Insurers Over Care, S.F.
CHRON. (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Eating-disorder-pa-
tients-battle-insurers-over-care-2310184.php (interviewing doctor who remarked
that, “[H]is patients have to be ‘literally on the verge of death’ to get hospitalized
and then their insurance coverage often dictates how much care or what kind of
care comes next”).
14. For a discussion of mental health coverage in employee health benefit
plans, see infra notes 20–54 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Parity Act and lower federal courts’ interpretations
prior to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, see infra notes 55–96 and accompanying text.
16. 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012).
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the court’s application of the Parity Act.17  Part V analyzes the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning and argues that Harlick successfully shifted the dialogue
from one of stringent parity to a broader, more flexible definition of parity
that remains sensitive to the case-specific needs of mental health pa-
tients.18  Finally, Part VI discusses implications of the Ninth Circuit’s hold-
ing for patients who, like Jeanene Harlick, are denied medically necessary
treatment.19
II. PLACING PARITY IN CONTEXT: FEDERAL APPROACHES TO MENTAL
HEALTH PARITY
The stories of Anna Westin’s denial of care or the Harlicks’ crippling
debt demonstrate the failure of a health care system that, despite federal
mental health parity reform, allowed insurance companies to deny or limit
medically necessary treatment to mental health patients.20  This section
provides a brief overview of the complex health care system that the Wes-
tins and Harlicks navigated in order to receive treatment for their daugh-
ters.21  As denials of care for mental health patients continued to rise in
the 1990s, so did the saliency of mental health parity, which resulted in
two stages of federal mental health parity reform.22  This section explains
the genesis of that legislation and its failure to comprehensively address
the needs of mental health patients.23
A. Mental Health Care Under Managed Care Settings
Today, most Americans obtain health care coverage through the
workplace.24  Most private insurers under employee benefit plans have his-
17. For a discussion of the majority opinion’s rationale and holding, see infra
notes 97–144 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion on how the Ninth Circuit’s holding has shifted the parity
framework from one of statutory interpretation to an individualized patient-cen-
tered analysis, see infra notes 145–74 and accompanying text.
19. For conclusions about the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s holding on future
mental health parity cases, see infra notes 175–95 and accompanying text.
20. See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal
Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (2012) (noting that, even
after passage of two pieces of federal mental health parity legislation, “[p]rivate
health insurers . . . have a long history of providing less comprehensive insurance
benefits to individuals with mental illness”).
21. See Westin, supra note 2 (describing confusion of insurance company’s
denial letters and their recommendation of treatment “without ever meeting Anna
or understanding her particular case”).
22. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 6 (describing federal attempts at achieving
mental health parity).
23. See id. at 6–7 (“Notwithstanding the efforts of mental health parity advo-
cates, neither the federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (“MHPA”) nor the Paul
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008 (“MHPAEA”) required private insurers to offer insurance benefits for mental
illness.” (footnotes omitted)).
24. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 419 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT] (finding
3
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torically limited mental health benefits due to fear of “high costs associ-
ated with long-term and intensive psychotherapy and extended hospital
stays.”25  In an effort to limit these benefits, insurers increased deduct-
ibles, reduced the number of annual outpatient visits, and lowered the
lifetime or annual limits on mental health care.26
As a reaction to the rising health care costs of the 1970s and 1980s,
many employers switched their health benefits to a managed care set-
ting.27  Through methods of cost containment, many managed care orga-
nizations were able to obtain mental health benefits at “relative equality”
with physical health benefits.28  Still, as the managed care organizations’
share of the employee benefit market expanded and health costs rose,
such organizations freely increased deductibles, reduced outpatient or in-
patient visits, and decreased lifetime or annual limits on care.29
These annual limits and increased out-of-pocket costs have become
particularly detrimental for mental illnesses such as anorexia nervosa,
both in terms of the treatment’s duration and cost.30  As in the case of
that eighty-four percent of Americans receive health benefits through employee
benefit plans, and that fifty-six percent of Americans are enrolled in managed care
organizations).
25. Id. at 418.  Insurance companies justified limiting mental health coverage
by citing the health economic principles of moral hazard and adverse selection.
See Tovino, supra note 20, at 9–10 (explaining impact of moral hazard and adverse
selection on mental health coverage).  Tovino explains that “[i]n the context of
mental health care, moral hazard refers to the concern that individuals who do not
pay for 100% of the cost of their own mental health care will use more mental
health services because they do not value these services at their full cost.” Id.  In
addition, adverse selection reflects the concern that, if a plan offers “generous
mental health benefits,” it “will attract individuals with greater mental health care
needs . . . .” Id. at 11.
26. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 9–11 (explaining measures taken by insur-
ance companies to limit mental health care coverage).
27. See Aviv Shamash, Note, A Piecemeal, Step-By-Step Approach Toward Mental
Health Parity, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 273, 277 (2011) (discussing mental
health parity in context of growing popularity of managed care organizations);
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 422.  According to the Surgeon Gen-
eral Report, fifty-six percent of Americans were covered under some type of man-
aged care organization by 1999. See id. (emphasizing importance of managed care
organizations in providing mental health care).  Unlike traditional private insur-
ance, managed care organizations use various financial incentives to control costs.
See id. at 423 (analyzing managed care organizations’ cost-control methods).  For
example, most managed care organizations shift inpatient treatment to an outpa-
tient setting, negotiate discounted hospital and doctor’s fees, and use a utilization
review process to certify a patient’s treatment to decide whether such treatment is
necessary. See id. (enumerating examples of cost-cutting strategies used by man-
aged care organizations).
28. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 277.
29. See id. (explaining how popularity of managed care organizations led to
lower quality mental health care).
30. See Beth A. Brunalli, Note, Anorexia Killed Her, But the System Failed Her: Does
the American Insurance System Suffer From Anorexia?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 583, 597–99
(2006) (discussing effects of insurance industry’s limitations on mental health care
in context of anorexia).  Anorexia, like most mental illnesses, deals with “complex
4
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Jeanene Harlick, a patient faces a losing choice when insurance compa-
nies cap mental health benefits.31  The patient’s family must incur debt to
help the patient complete the treatment, or the patient must stop treat-
ment before achieving their ideal body weight and risk relapsing.32
B. Federal and State Legislative Impetus: The Federal Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996
In the 1990s, federal and state legislatures began to consider mental
health parity legislation in order to equalize the disparity between physical
and mental health coverage.33  One commentator has argued that the leg-
islative movement toward mental health parity was the product of three
factors.34  First, developments in medical research shifted the dialogue
around mental illness from one of stigmatization to one of understanding,
as new research revealed biological bases for these illnesses.35  Second, as
biopsychosocial issues” that require an integrated approach to treatment, includ-
ing “medical, nutritional, and mental health professionals.” Id. at 589–91.  As
such, anorexia patients often require a more intense care regiment for a longer
period of time. See id. at 595 (comparing insurance company’s coverage plan with
clinical guidelines on treatment of anorexia).  Applying the American Psychiatric
Association guidelines to most insurance companies’ restrictions on hospital stays,
Brunalli stated that “restoration of ideal body weight . . . cannot be achieved in ten
to fifteen days unless the patient’s ideal body weight is forty pounds.” Id. at 595
n.86.  Insurance companies’ limitations of mental health coverage do not only in-
hibit the duration of treatment that a patient may need, but they also imposes
prohibitive costs on patients. See id. at 596 (“[T]he patient or the patient’s parents
must finance on average $80,000 of care, which is nearly two-thirds of the cost of
treatment, per incident of the disorder.”).
31. See id. at 597 (noting that anorexia is “[a] perpetuating cycle of illness”
because insurance companies’ coverage limitations frustrate complete treatment).
32. See id. (“Not surprisingly, the rate of relapse or readmission has more than
doubled since the proliferation of mental illness limitations.”).
33. See Dana L. Kaplan, Note, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental
Health Dilemma?  Current Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 328 (2005) (discussing emergence of mental health
parity legislation).
34. See id. at 328–29 (discussing factors leading to passage of parity legisla-
tion).  For a full discussion of these factors, see infra notes 35–37 and accompany-
ing text.
35. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 328 (enumerating factors that led to influx of
mental health parity legislation in 1990s).  The clinical community uses two main
classification systems to define mental illness. See Marcia C. Peck & Richard M.
Scheffler, An Analysis of the Definitions of Mental Illness Used in State Parity Laws, 53
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1089, 1089–90 (2002), available at http://ps.psychiatryon-
line.org/data/Journals/PSS/4351/1089.pdf (finding that definitions of mental
health in state parity laws can influence access, cost, and insurance reimburse-
ment).  The first classification comes from the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”). See id. (explaining
different clinical classification systems for mental illnesses).  The DSM defines
mental illness as a “clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual, . . . is associated with present distress . . . or
disability . . . or with a significant increased risk of suffering.” Id. (alterations in
original).  The second main classification views mental illnesses as brain disorders,
5
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a result of these new findings, mental health advocacy rose in the 1990s.36
Lastly, the passage of the federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996
(“MHPA”) influenced states to create their own mental health parity
legislation.37
Although the MHPA spurred state legislators to consider their own
mental health parity legislation, the effect of the MHPA remained negligi-
ble.38  Rather than mandate mental health coverage on an equal basis
among all insurers, the MHPA only regulated insurers who already pro-
and is built on premise that “disruptions in brain function lead to mental illness.”
Id.  Clinicians view this second classification as “too limiting, because no single
gene or underlying brain lesion has been found for any disorder except
Alzheimer’s disease.” Id.  Despite its criticism, this second classification is used by
biopsychiatrists who define mental illness by heredity or genetic makeup. See id.
(describing use of classification systems by clinicians).  Despite the differing classi-
fications in the clinical community, both definitions of mental illness suggest that
the bases of such disorders “are now considered physical, or biological, rather than
‘mental.’”  Richard E. Gardner, Comment, Mind Over Matter?  The Historical Search
for Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J.
675, 683 (2000) (discussing how advances in brain science show biological compo-
nents to mental illnesses).  For example, researchers have found that in the brains
of those patients who suffer from major depression, there is a decrease in neural
activity. Id. at 684.  In addition, panic disorders are now thought to have a bio-
chemical basis because of patients’ positive responses to chemical treatments, like
antidepressants. Id. at 685.
36. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 329 (noting that as of 2005, there were over
360 organizations that support mental health parity).  Support for mental health
parity legislation expanded beyond professional organizations to include federal
legislators. See Melissa M. McGow, Comment, A Plan for Recovery: Steps to Finally
Provide Adequate Insurance Coverage for Those Starving for it the Most, 15 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 583, 607–09 (2010) (discussing federal support for comprehen-
sive federal parity statute).  Representative Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island, who
suffered from periods of depression, remarked that federal parity legislation was
“one more step in the long civil rights struggle to ensure that all Americans have
the opportunity to reach their potential.” Id. at 609.  Representative Kennedy’s
father, the late United States Senator Edward Kennedy, also remarked that insur-
ance companies’ limitations on mental health benefits were “senseless discrimina-
tion.” Id. at 606.
37. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 329 (discussing impetus of federal and state
mental health parity statutes).  Before 1996, only five states had adopted mental
health parity laws: Maryland, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Maine, and Minne-
sota. See Peck & Scheffler, supra note 35, at 1089–90 (analyzing different classifica-
tion systems and their incorporation into early state parity laws).  After the MHPA
was passed, twenty-nine states passed parity bills with stronger provisions than the
MHPA. See id. (describing rise of state parity laws as reaction to federal parity legis-
lation).  As of December 2011, forty-eight states had passed mental health parity
laws, though the type of mandate varied. See Richard Cauchi, Steven Landess &
Andrew Thangasamy, State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
health/mental-health-benefits-state-laws-mandating-or-re.aspx (last updated Dec.
2012) (surveying all states’ steps towards achieving mental health parity).  Only
Michigan and Pennsylvania had not passed mental health parity laws by December
2011, but both states require insurers to cover substance abuse treatment. Id.
38. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 20, at 35–38 (discussing “incomplete develop-
ment” of mental health parity laws on federal level).
6
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vided mental health coverage.39  While this minimal mandate isolated
many insurance plans from the law’s effects, two additional exemptions
limited the law’s impact.40  Small employers were entirely exempt from
the MHPA’s requirements.41  Moreover, group health plans were exempt
from the law’s requirements if compliance with the MHPA increased the
costs under the plan.42
In addition to these exemptions, Congress’s failure to define “mental
health benefits” within the MHPA contributed to the law’s inefficacy, as it
gave insurance companies the discretion to define and limit the range of
mental illnesses that it would cover.43  Eating disorders, for example, were
not expressly mentioned in the MHPA.44  Congress’s failure to close this
discretionary gap was most likely a political decision, as one study has
found that legislators’ decisions to define mental illness are influenced by
“ideologies of advocacy groups and parity opponents, cost, and political
necessity,” rather than “needs-based studies and clinical judgment.”45
C. A Second Federal Attempt at Achieving Mental Health Parity
In 2008, President Bush signed into law the Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act (“MHPAEA”), which addressed the continuing issue
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(1),(2) (2006) (stating that MHPA only regulates
lifetime and annual spending limits of those insurance plans that cover both physi-
cal and mental health benefits).
40. See McGow, supra note 36, at 588–94 (discussing limitations of MHPA).
41. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712(c)(1)(A),
110 Stat 2874, 2944 (“This section shall not apply to any group health plan (and
group health insurance coverage offered in connection with a group health plan)
for any plan year of a small employer.”).  Further, the MHPA defined a small em-
ployer as one “who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than 50 employ-
ees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least
2 employees on the first day of the plan year.” Id. § 712(c)(1)(B).
42. See id. § 712(c)(2) (“This section shall not apply with respect to a group
health plan . . . if the application of this section to such plan . . . results in an
increase in the cost under the plan . . . of at least 1 percent.”).
43. See id. § 712(e)(4) (“‘[M]ental health benefits’ means benefits with re-
spect to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage
(as the case may be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of
substance abuse or chemical dependency.”); Shamash, supra note 27, at 282 (dis-
cussing limitations of MHPA).
44. See McGow, supra note 36, at 592 (“Although the MHPA did not exclude
eating disorders from the list of mental illnesses, it also did not explicitly include
them; rather, the employer was allowed to define what constitutes mental illnesses
and easily excluded eating disorders.”).
45. Peck & Scheffler, supra note 35, at 1091.  The authors of the study noted
that while federal legislation has not defined mental illness to date, the term’s use
in federal legislation has nevertheless been interpreted “to include all disorders in
DSM [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders].” Id. at 1090.  For a
full discussion of the two main classifications of mental illness among the clinical
community, see supra note 35.
7
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of disparate mental health coverage by private insurers.46  The MHPAEA
was more comprehensive than the MHPA because it expanded the
MHPA’s mandate to include substance use disorders.47  Moreover, the
MHPAEA broadly prohibited insurance companies from imposing une-
qual financial or coverage restrictions on mental health care.48  This lan-
guage extended beyond the MHPA, which only prohibited the imposition
of disparate annual and lifetime limits.49  In addition, insurers could not
place more restrictive limitations on mental health beneficiaries in terms
of deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, out-of-pocket expenses, number
of doctor’s visits, or days of coverage.50
Although the MHPAEA was more comprehensive than the MHPA,
the law suffered similar setbacks in terms of its limited scope.51  Much like
the MHPA, exemptions for small employers and group health plans that
would experience cost increases severely limited the law’s reach.52  Moreo-
ver, the law’s mandating power extended only to those insurance plans
that already covered mental health benefits.53  Under the MHPAEA, it was
possible that insurers could choose not to cover mental health benefits
and remain exempt from federal mental health parity legislation
entirely.54
46. See Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addic-
tion Equity Act of 2008, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)-(g) (2006) (requiring non-exempt
insurance companies to provide equal mental health and physical health services).
47. See id. § 1185a(a)(1)(A) (“If the plan or coverage does not include an
aggregate lifetime limit on substantially all medical and surgical benefits, the plan
or coverage may not impose any aggregate lifetime limit on mental health or sub-
stance use disorder benefits.”).
48. See id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (stating that group health plans that cover
both medical and mental health benefits must ensure that financial requirements
and treatment limitations are no more restrictive than predominant limitations
placed on medical care).
49. See id. § 1185a(a)(1)(A)-(B),(2)(A)-(B) (barring imposition of lifetime or
annual limits for health plans that offer medical and surgical benefits, as well as
mental health and substance abuse benefits).
50. See id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(i) (defining scope of what constitutes financial
requirement under MHPAEA).
51. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 38 (discussing limitations of MHPAEA, as
compared to MHPA).
52. See id. (“MHPAEA . . . did not apply to small group health plans, individ-
ual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any
self-funded, non-federal governmental plans whose sponsor opted out of
MHPAEA.”).
53. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 278 (discussing differing levels of
mandatory state parity laws).  For a discussion on the varying levels of mandating
power, see infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
54. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 38 (“In terms of its substantive provisions,
MHPAEA also was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is,
nothing in the MHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or
provide any mental health benefits.”).
8
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III. SEARCHING FOR A CURE: CALIFORNIA’S PARITY ACT
While federal legislation fails to provide a comprehensive framework
for covering mental illnesses in the private insurance context, many state
mental health parity laws require insurers to offer broader coverage for
mental health benefits.55  At issue in Harlick was California’s Parity Act,
which the California legislature passed in 1999.56  The Parity Act sought to
improve access to mental health care by requiring health insurance plans
to provide equal coverage for physical and mental health illnesses.57
A. Analyzing California’s Parity Act
Four factors influence the comprehensiveness of state mental health
parity laws.58  First, the statutory definition of mental illness indicates the
breadth of the parity law and can range from a “broad-based mental ill-
ness” to a narrow “serious mental illness” definition.59  Although Califor-
55. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 287 (asserting that state parity laws are
more comprehensive than federal parity laws).
56. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(d)(1)-(9) (West 2003) (requir-
ing that all non-exempt insurers provide equal services for mental and physical
health care).
57. See id. (stating goals of Parity Act); see also Lucas Quass, Federal Efforts to
Achieve Mental Health Parity: A Step in the Right Direction, but Discrimination Remains, 4
LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 35, 52 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.ameri-
can.edu/lpb/vol4/iss1/2 (providing background information regarding passage
of California’s Parity Act).
58. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 287–88 (analyzing state parity laws’ varying
levels of mandating power).
59. See id. (explaining states’ varying definitions of mental illness); see also
Kaplan, supra note 33, at 351 (analyzing state mental health parity laws under a
similar framework).  A study conducted by the American Psychiatric Association
determined that state mental health parity laws define mental illness in one of
three ways: from the most comprehensive “broad-based mental illness” to the less
encompassing “serious mental illness” or “biologically based mental illness.”  Peck
& Scheffler, supra note 35, at 1090.  Broad-based mental illness is defined by a
“person’s ability to function rather than his or her diagnosis.” Id. at 1091.  Many of
the states whose parity laws are defined as “broad-based” cover all mental illnesses
that are contained in the DSM. See id. (analyzing three definitions of mental illness
that states have adopted for parity laws).  For a full discussion of the DSM classifica-
tion of mental illness, see supra note 30.  Although state definitions vary for “seri-
ous mental illness,” the definition does not include every mental illness contained
in the DSM. See Quass, supra note 57, at 52 (discussing limitations of using “severe
mental illness” definition in parity laws).  State laws that use the term serious or
severe mental illness typically only address those illnesses that are considered “pri-
ority populations.”  Peck & Scheffler, supra note 35, at 1091.  These priority popu-
lations include those individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder
and other anxiety disorders, and attention-deficit hyperactive disorder. See id. (de-
fining scope of mental illness to select priority populations).  Only six states have
defined mental illness as “biologically based”: Massachusetts, Missouri, Virginia,
New Jersey, Colorado, and South Dakota. See id. at 1093 (studying different states’
adopted definitions of mental illness).  The authors of the study noted that these
states are “charting new territory because the term [biologically-based mental ill-
ness] has never been used in federal legislation and has no accepted clinical defi-
9
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nia’s Parity Act uses the word “severe mental illness,” the statute’s
definition of “severe” encompasses the same priority populations that a
“serious mental illness” definition addresses, including schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorders,
panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive developmental
disorder or autism, anorexia nervosa, and bulimia nervosa.60
Second, the mandating structure that the legislature chooses also de-
termines the comprehensiveness of a state mental health parity law.61  A
mandatory benefit structure requires insurers to provide mental health
benefits.62  Conversely, a mandatory offer structure only requires insurers
to offer a plan with mental health benefits and to charge accordingly.63
The weakest mandating structure is the mandated-if-offered framework,
which requires insurers to provide mental health benefits to the same ex-
tent that they provide physical health care.64  The Parity Act reads,
“[e]very health care service plan contract . . . that provides hospital, medi-
cal, or surgical coverage shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically
necessary treatment of severe mental illnesses of a person of any age . . . .”65  The
Parity Act, unlike federal parity laws, is a mandated benefit statute that
requires all non-exempt insurers to provide coverage for the diagnosis and
medically necessary treatment of severe mental illnesses.66  As seen in Har-
lick, a state’s chosen framework can lead to contentious litigation.67
nition.” Id. at 1091.  For a discussion on the clinical community’s criticisms of the
“biologically-based” definition, see supra note 35.
60. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(d)(1)-(9) (West 2003) (defin-
ing scope of mental illnesses required by Parity Act).  Though California’s statute
defines this list of mental illnesses as “severe,” rather than “serious,” the list is con-
sistent with other states’ definitions of “serious mental illness.” See Peck & Schef-
fler, supra note 35, at 1091 (discussing states’ definitions of mental illnesses).
61. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 290 (analyzing how mandating structure of
parity laws impact its comprehensiveness).
62. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 351–53 (discussing mandatory benefit frame-
work).  Kaplan notes that common statutory language for a mandated benefit stat-
ute reads as follows: “a plan shall provide benefits for diagnosis and mental health
treatment under the same terms and conditions as provided for covered benefits
for the treatment of other physical illnesses.” Id. at 351.
63. See id. at 352 (discussing mandatory offer framework for state parity laws).
A mandated offer statute would typically read, “insurers must make available cover-
age for the treatment of mental illness . . . .” Id. at 352.
64. See id. (defining various parity frameworks and their levels of mandating
power).  The language of a mandated-if-offered statute would read, “in the case of
a group health plan that provides mental health benefits, those benefits must be
provided on par with benefits for other physical illnesses . . . .” Id.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(a) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
66. See id. (stating that all insurers must provide mental health coverage).  For
a discussion of the various mandating frameworks, see supra notes 61–65 and ac-
companying text.
67. See id. (requiring that all insurers are obligated to provide mental health
coverage on parity with physical health coverage).  As a mandated-benefit statute,
the Parity Act requires insurers to provide coverage for “medically necessary treat-
ment of severe mental illnesses,” which includes the following: outpatient services,
inpatient hospital services, partial hospital services, and prescription drugs, if the
10
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Third, how state legislators choose to regulate the terms of insurance
plans also dictates the statute’s comprehensiveness.68  The Parity Act regu-
lates insurance plans by requiring that “[t]he terms and conditions ap-
plied to the benefits required by this section . . . shall be applied equally to
all benefits under the plan contract.”69  However, the Parity Act only re-
quires the following terms and conditions to be equal among mental
health and physical health benefits: maximum lifetime limits, copayments,
and individual and family deductibles.70
Lastly, the exemptions contained in a state mental health parity law
can easily frustrate its comprehensiveness.71  The largest exemption
placed on state mental health parity laws is the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).72  As a federal scheme that regulates
plan covers them. Id. § 1374.72(a), (b)(1)–(4).  For definitions of these care set-
tings, see infra note 106.  Based on this mandated benefit language, the main issue
in Harlick was whether the Parity Act required coverage of residential care, which
required a preliminary analysis of whether subsection (b) of the Parity Act was an
exhaustive list of treatments. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 712
(9th Cir. 2012).  In addition, the Ninth Circuit also decided whether the Parity Act,
under subsection (b) required coverage for all medically necessary treatments of
the mental illnesses enumerated in subsection (d). See id. at 713–17 (interpreting
Parity Act).
68. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 291 (analyzing how parity law’s regulation
of terms and conditions affects law’s comprehensiveness).
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(c)(1)–(3) (West 2003).
70. See id. (limiting applicable terms and conditions). The Parity Act does not
regulate a plan’s other terms and conditions, such as “out-of pocket maximums,
and inpatient and outpatient visitation maximums.” See Shamash, supra note 27, at
291 (enumerating different terms and conditions that parity law may regulate).
The provision may not be exhaustive however, as it uses the language “shall in-
clude, but not be limited to” when it lists the terms and conditions. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(c) (West 2003).  For a discussion on how the Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted this same statutory language under subsection (b) of the Parity
Act, see infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
71. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 291–92 (analyzing how federal legislation
can exempt or preempt state parity laws and inhibit their efficacy).  For a brief
discussion of ERISA preemption in the context of state parity laws, see infra note
72.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006) (regulating state laws relating to employee bene-
fit plans).  ERISA broadly preempts any state law that relates to an employee bene-
fit plan. See id. § 1144(a) (explaining statute’s preemptions).  An exception to this
broad preemption lies in the “savings clause,” which “saves” certain state laws from
preemption, such as those laws regulating insurance. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  A
state law is exempt from ERISA preemption if it is directed towards “entities en-
gaged in insurance” and if the law “substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrange-
ment between the insurer and the insured.”  Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc.
v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003).  The Tenth Circuit has upheld a district court’s
holding that ERISA does not preempt state parity laws. See Douglas S. v. Altius
Health Plans, Inc., 409 Fed. App’x 219, 222 n.3 (2010) (declining to review district
court’s finding that ERISA did not preempt state parity law because “neither party
briefed this issue . . . and it [was] unnecessary to reach this issue to resolve this
appeal”); see also Z.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Grp. Health Coop., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015
(W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that ERISA did not preempt Washington’s mental
health parity law).  Conversely, the Eighth Circuit has held that an additional ER-
11
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employee health benefit plans, many state law parity claims are dismissed
upon the threshold issue of whether ERISA preempts the parity law.73
B. Applying the Parity Act: Inconsistency in the Lower Federal and
State Courts
The patchwork approach that federal and state governments have
taken towards parity legislation has hindered the efficacy of federal and
state parity laws.74  Despite advocacy efforts and court cases addressing the
comprehensiveness of mental health parity laws, most state and federal
parity laws remain riddled with exemptions and limited mandates.75  The
Ninth Circuit’s ruling finally provides an example of a comprehensive
state parity regime that places the patient, rather than the insurance com-
pany, at the center of the parity analysis.76
Since the passage of the Parity Act, both lower federal and California
state courts have grappled with interpreting the law, and more specifically,
the subsection that specifies what modalities of treatment are to be pro-
vided on an equal basis.77  In Harlick, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether
the list of mandated services in subsection (b) of the Parity Act was exhaus-
ISA provision, the “deemer clause,” continues to exempt some employee benefit
plans from state mental health parity laws. See Daley v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 415 F.3d
889, 894–95 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that “self-funded ERISA plans are exempt
from state regulation insofar as that regulation ‘relate[s] to’ the plans” (alteration
in original)).  The circuit courts’ disagreement regarding whether state parity laws
are exempted by the savings clause or deemer clause is beyond the scope of this
Casenote.  For a further discussion on how ERISA interacts with state parity legisla-
tion, see Quass, supra note 57, at 55–56.
73. See Daley, 415 F.3d at 894–95 (“[S]elf-funded ERISA plans are exempt
from state regulation insofar as that regulation ‘relate[s] to’ the plans.” (alteration
in original)).  For a discussion of the current circuit split and other federal courts’
holdings on the threshold issue of ERISA preemption and state parity laws, see
supra note 72.
74. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 301–06 (discussing how federal and state
mental health parity laws interact).
75. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 38–39 (comparing exemptions in MHPA and
MHPAEA); see also Shamash, supra note 27, at 292–93 (analyzing federal limita-
tions on state parity acts).
76. See California’s Mental Health Parity Act Requires Health Plan to Cover “Medi-
cally Necessary” Residential Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa, CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP.
(THOMPSON WEST), July 2012, at 4 [hereinafter Parity Act Requires “Medically Neces-
sary” Coverage] (“California’s Mental Health Parity Act requires insurers and health
care plans subject to the Act to provide medically necessary treatment for eating
disorders, even if its policy specifically excludes such treatment.”).
77. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(b)(1)–(4) (West 2003)
(“These benefits shall include the following: (1) outpatient services, (2) inpatient
hospital services, (3) partial hospital services, [and] (4) prescription drugs, if the
plan contract includes coverage for prescription drugs.”).  The Department of
Managed Health Care (“DMHC”) was charged with promulgating the regulation
that would enforce the Parity Act. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 712 (“[T]he California
Department of Managed Health Care . . . promulgated a regulation implementing
the Parity Act in 2003.”).  For a discussion of this regulation and the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation, see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
12
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tive.78  If so, the subsection would only mandate parity in outpatient ser-
vices, inpatient hospital services, partial hospital services, and prescription
drugs under certain plans.79
In Wayne W. v. Blue Cross of California,80 the district court for the Dis-
trict of Utah held that the Parity Act “does not, on its face, require Blue
Cross to provide benefits for stays at a residential treatment center on the
same basis as other medical benefits.”81  Although Utah has its own mental
health parity law, the district court interpreted California’s Parity Act be-
cause the plaintiff was a beneficiary of his father’s benefit plan, which was
provided by Blue Cross of California.82  In its interpretation of California’s
Parity Act, the court reasoned that interpreting subsection (b) of the Par-
ity Act as an exhaustive list “comports with general rules of statutory con-
struction.”83  Moreover, the court noted that interpreting the Parity Act
any other way would violate the intent of the Department of Managed
Health Care (“DMHC”).84
The DMHC’s administrative history leading to the promulgation of
the Parity Act’s accompanying regulations became the crux of the North-
ern District of California’s rationale in Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Califor-
78. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 712 (stating that court would hear issue of whether
residential care was required by Parity Act because both parties requested ruling
on that issue and because record was fully developed).
79. See id. (determining that if subsection was not exhaustive, Parity Act would
only require parity in four modalities of treatment).
80. No. 1:07-CV-00035 PGC, 2007 WL 3243610, at *1 (D. Utah Nov. 1, 2007).
81. Id. at *3.  The plaintiff in Wayne was a minor diagnosed with severe atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder, mood disorder, substance abuse, and other
high-risk behaviors. See id. at *1.  The plaintiff was placed in a residential treat-
ment center for adolescents, where he stayed for 371 days between 2004 and 2005.
See id.  Because Blue Cross’s contract placed an annual limit of one hundred days
of treatment at such a facility, the plaintiff’s additional care was denied in 2005
when he exceeded his annual limit. See id.  The plaintiff argued that, “Blue Cross’s
application of the limitation on treatment at Island View violates California law,
ERISA, and the Plan.” Id. at *2.  The court found that, “[e]ven assuming for the
sake of argument that the California parity statute at issue is saved from ERISA
preemption,” the Parity Act did not require Blue Cross to provide residential treat-
ment “on the same basis as other medical benefits.” Id. at *3.
82. Id. at *1 (explaining application of California Parity Act in Utah).
83. Id. at *4.  In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the non-
exhaustive list in subsection (c) of the Parity Act implies that the absence of similar
wording in subsection (b) “can only signify that the four specifically listed benefits
are the only ones required by the law . . . .” Id.
84. See id. (emphasizing that DMHC’s intent was crucial to interpretation of
Parity Act).  The court cited to a 2005 DMHC study of California’s managed care
plans, noting the agency’s findings, which stated that “[t]he coverage and use of
RTCs [residential treatment centers] vary markedly among plans . . . .” Id. (altera-
tions in original).  The study justified such varied coverage by asserting that each
of these managed care plans made a “policy decision.” Id.  Thus, the court held
that, in light of its statutory interpretation and the “DMHC’s characterization of
the very limitation on residential treatment . . . as a ‘policy decision,’” the Parity
Act did not require Blue Cross to cover residential treatment on the same level as
other medical benefits. Id.
13
Lagreca: Treating a Chronic Case of Discrimination: The Ninth Circuit's Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR203.txt unknown Seq: 14  3-APR-13 11:24
282 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 269
nia.85  In Daniel F., the district court adopted the Wayne court’s
interpretation of the Parity Act, and held that the insurance company’s
reading of subsection (b) was “reasonable and in good faith.”86  The court
cited the DMHC’s survey of managed care plans, which noted that a plan’s
limitation of treatment facilities is a “policy decision” that is left to the
discretion of the insurance company.87  While the court noted that the
DMHC’s reports do not “have the force and effect of law,” the findings
were nevertheless “relevant to the analysis of whether the Parity Act re-
quires coverage for residential treatment.”88
The dicta in one California appellate court holding alluded to a
broad interpretation of what the Parity Act deems “medically necessary.”89
In Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,90 the California Court of Appeals
noted that a categorical denial of “coverage for mental health care services
that may . . . be medically necessary” constitutes a violation of the Parity
Act.91  The appellate court concluded that “the trial court too narrowly
85. No. C 09-2037 PJH, 2011 WL 830623, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (hold-
ing that California legislators did not intend for Parity Act to cover all mental
health services).  In Daniel F., the plaintiff’s son was admitted to a wilderness ther-
apy program after receiving “acute inpatient psychiatric treatment on several occa-
sions.” Id.  Before his admission, Blue Shield informed the plaintiff that
residential treatment was not a covered benefit. See id.  Plaintiffs filed suit, arguing
that Blue Shield’s practice of excluding residential treatment violated the Parity
Act. See id. at *2.
86. Id. at *7.  The court referred to the plan’s contract, noting that inpatient
mental health services were covered, “but only when those services are provided at
a ‘Hospital’ . . . .” Id.  Because the treatment facility was not accredited as a psychi-
atric hospital, or even a “psychiatric health care facility” under pertinent California
law, Blue Shield did not err in rejecting coverage. See id. (reasoning that lack of
accreditation under state law did not require Blue Shield to cover residential
treatment).
87. See id. at *9 (deferring to insurance company in regards to mental health
coverage).  The court expanded its reasoning outside of the plan contract, looking
to the administrative history of the DMHC’s promulgation of the Parity Act’s regu-
lation, which cited a lack of residential care as a plan’s “policy decision.” See id.
(citing administrative agency’s previous research to justify limiting mental health
coverage).  Rather than adopting an expansive meaning of what constitutes “medi-
cally necessary treatment,” the court interpreted the Parity Act to require “Blue
Shield [to] provide[ ] benefits for mental health conditions on a par with those for
other medical conditions, for outpatient services, inpatient hospital services, and
partial hospital services.” Id. at *8.
88. Id. at *9 (citing Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 960
P.2d 1031, 1036 (Cal. 1998)).
89. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that categorical denial of coverage also violates Parity Act).
90. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Ct. App. 2010).
91. Id. at 565.  In Arce, the plaintiff was a four-year-old boy who was diagnosed
with autism, and was a member of a Kaiser health plan that excluded “custodial
care” from its coverage. See id. at 478–79 (describing plaintiff’s mental health ill-
ness).  The Kaiser plan defined custodial care as “assistance with activities of daily
living, . . . or care that can be performed safely and effectively by people, who in
order to provide the care, do not require medical licenses or certificates or the
presence of a supervising licensed nurse.” Id. at 479.
14
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read the . . . protections of the Mental Health Parity Act.”92  Moreover, the
appellate court corrected the trial court’s finding that the Parity Act re-
quired the plaintiff to prove why the treatment was medically necessary.93
In doing so, the Arce court noted two ways in which an insurance company
could violate the Parity Act.94  The first and most widely acknowledged way
of violating the Parity Act occurs when an insurance company wrongfully
denies care that was medically necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
a severe mental illness.95  In addition, the Arce court held that an insur-
ance company’s failure to make the medically necessary inquiry at all con-
stitutes a second means of violating the Parity Act.96
IV. DIAGNOSING A SICK SYSTEM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULING IN
HARLICK V. BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA
In Harlick, the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of the Parity Act in
deciding whether one of the Act’s subsections only required parity in lim-
ited modalities of treatment.97  Though the court limited its analysis to
residential treatment of anorexia nervosa, the majority broadly held that
the Parity Act required coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary
treatment of all severe mental illnesses listed in the statute.98  Such a hold-
ing is not only cognizant of the case-specific needs of mental health pa-
tients, but it also illustrates how judicial action can augment legislative
92. Id. at 565.  The trial court reasoned that because the Parity Act only man-
dates “medically necessary treatment,” the plaintiff must prove that the therapies at
issue were medically necessary in order to determine whether the Parity Act had
been violated. See id. (determining that trial court erred in holding that plaintiff
must prove whether treatment was medically necessary).  The appellate court re-
jected this reasoning and noted that:
It is possible that Arce also could prove a statutory violation by showing
that Kaiser categorically denies coverage for mental health care services
that may, in some circumstances, be medically necessary, and that Kaiser
does so without considering whether such services are in fact medically
necessary for its individual plan members.
Id.
93. See id. (concluding that trial court “too narrowly read . . . the protections
of the Mental Health Parity Act”).
94. See id. at 565–67 (establishing two-prong analysis for violations of Parity
Act).
95. See id. at 565 (noting that denial of medically necessary treatment is “one
means of establishing a violation [of] the statute,” but “not the exclusive means”).
96. See id. at 566 (stating that insurance company’s categorical denial of re-
viewing medically necessary inquiry constitutes violation of Parity Act).  Unlike the
district courts in Wayne W. and Daniel F., the appellate court in Arce suggested that
an insurer’s liability could be expanded to include occurrences when the company
“never considers the issue of medical necessity because it has concluded that there
is no coverage for these therapies in the first place.” Id.  at 565.
97. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 2012).
98. See id. at 721 (reasoning that such interpretation was “common sense”).
15
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efforts by providing states with a broad, regulatory scheme for mental
health parity.99
A. Facts and Procedural History of Harlick
Plaintiff Jeanene Harlick brought suit against Blue Shield of Califor-
nia (“Blue Shield”) after the insurer refused to cover her residential treat-
ment for anorexia.100  Harlick had been suffering from anorexia nervosa
since she was about eighteen years old.101  When Harlick was thirty-eight
years old, she relapsed and sought intensive outpatient treatment for her
anorexia.102  This treatment was covered through Blue Shield, who was
her employer’s health insurance provider.103
As Harlick’s condition worsened, her doctor recommended a more
intense course of treatment than the outpatient treatment that she had
been receiving.104  Blue Shield informed Harlick that, pursuant to her
plan, only medically necessary “partial or inpatient (full-time) hospitaliza-
tion” was covered.105  Though Blue Shield referred Harlick to several facil-
ities that were covered under her plan, her doctors “determined that none
of the in-network facilities suggested by Blue Shield could provide effective
treatment.”106  As such, Harlick sought treatment at an out-of-network
provider, the Castlewood Treatment Center, in Missouri.107
99. See id. (holding that insurance companies were required to provide all
medically necessary treatment for severe mental illnesses); see also infra note 172
(discussing other state courts’ mental health parity holdings). But see Tovino, supra
note 20, at 2 (describing courts’ failure to effectively rule in favor of patients’
rights).
100. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 706.
101. See id. at 703 (recounting plaintiff’s history of anorexia).
102. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s previous treatment of anorexia).
103. See id. (noting that Blue Shield had previously covered treatment of
plaintiff’s anorexia).
104. See id. (describing Harlick’s worsening anorexia).
105. Id. (explaining denial of coverage).
106. Id. at 703–04.
107. See id. at 704 (describing Harlick’s new course of treatment).
Castlewood’s care levels were at varying degrees of intensity, including: “a commu-
nity support group, an outpatient program, an intensive outpatient program, day
treatment, ‘Step Down’ or partial hospitalization, and residential care.” Id.  De-
spite these varying methods of care, Castlewood’s website “consistently” classifies
the facility as residential. Id.  (discussing website and its information on residential
treatment).  For purposes of this Note, Blue Shield’s definitions for these methods
of care will be used.  Blue Shield defines an inpatient as “an individual who has
been admitted to a Hospital or a Skilled Nursing Facility as a registered bed patient
and is receiving Services under the direction of a Physician.” BLUE SHIELD OF CAL.,
SHIELD SAVER 4000: HEALTH PLAN FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES, EVIDENCE OF COV-
ERAGE AND HEALTH SERVICE AGREEMENT 69 (2012), available at https://www.
blueshieldca.com/producer/download/public/ShieldSaver4000_7-12.pdf (defin-
ing types of care provided under basic Blue Shield plan).  An outpatient facility is
defined as “a licensed facility, not a Physician’s office or Hospital, that provides
medical and/or surgical services on an Outpatient basis.” Id. at 65.  An intensive
outpatient care program is defined as “an Outpatient Mental Health (or substance
16
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Blue Shield paid for Harlick’s first eleven days of treatment at
Castlewood, but refused to pay for the rest of her treatment.108  Various
internal documents showed that upon review by Blue Shield employees,
Harlick’s coverage was denied because the treatment facility “appear[ed]
to be residential care as stated in the consent to treatment/treatment plan
[and] [r]esidential treatment is not a benefit.”109  In her disputes with
Blue Shield, Harlick received several inconsistent letters stating why cover-
age was denied.110  Though all of the letters from Blue Shield employees
explained that residential treatment was not covered under her plan,
other employees noted that Harlick needed to be authorized by the
Mental Health Services Administrator to seek out-of-state treatment.111  In
corresponding with Harlick, employees also noted that the Parity Act did
not require them to offer residential treatment because the plan did not
cover residential care “whether the diagnosis [wa]s for a mental health
condition or a medical condition.”112
abuse) treatment program utilized when a patient’s condition requires structure,
monitoring, and medical/psychological intervention at least three (3) hours per
day, three (3) times per week.” Id. at 69.  Partial hospitalization is defined as a
“treatment program that may be freestanding or Hospital-based and provides Ser-
vices at least five (5) hours per day and at least four (4) days per week.” Id.  “Pa-
tients may be admitted directly to this level of care, or transferred from acute
Inpatient care following acute stabilization.” Id.  Residential care is defined as “ser-
vices provided in a facility or a free-standing residential treatment center that pro-
vides overnight/extended-stay services for Members who do not qualify for Acute
Care or Skilled Nursing Services.” Id. at 70.
108. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 705 (recounting plaintiff’s communications with
Blue Shield).  In their communication with Harlick, Blue Shield claimed that the
first eleven days of coverage were due to a coding error. See id. at 708.
109. Id. at 704–05.  Harlick’s plan covered the following mental health ser-
vices: inpatient services, limited outpatient services, office visits, psychological test-
ing, and in-person and telephone counseling. See id.  For physical illnesses, the
plan covered “extensive hospital treatment,” outpatient care, office visits, and suba-
cute care. See id. (discussing coverage for physical illnesses).
110. See id. at 705–07 (recounting plaintiff’s communications with Blue
Shield).  For a discussion of the communications between Harlick and Blue Shield
during her appeals process, see infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
111. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 705 (explaining plaintiff’s communications with
insurance company during internal reviews process).  This was clarified in later
letters, in which another employee explained that the preauthorization require-
ment did not apply to out-of-state facilities; see also Thompkins v. BC Life & Health
Ins. Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 953, 960 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that Parity Act “does
not limit application of the parity law on the basis of where the individual benefi-
ciaries live or seek medical care”).
112. Harlick, 686 F.3d at 706.  After citing a preauthorization requirement
and the inapplicability of California’s Parity Act, Blue Cross sent a final letter to
Harlick that explained the ultimate reason for denial of coverage—her plan did
not cover residential care. See id. (noting that plaintiff had exhausted Blue Shield’s
internal review process).  Moreover, the letter explained that the first eleven days
of her facility expenses were only paid because of a “coding error.” Id.  (noting
error in payment).  The medical coder used a billing code that “did not identify
the claim as a mental health diagnosis,” so the claim was paid. Id.
17
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Harlick’s mother appealed Blue Shield’s coverage decision to the Cal-
ifornia Insurance Commissioner.113  After an investigation was conducted
by the DMHC, the agency’s senior counsel noted that, “although [Harlick]
ha[d] been provided with conflicting information from the Plan regard-
ing its basis for denial,” Blue Shield had denied coverage because Har-
lick’s plan did not cover residential care.114  Harlick brought suit against
Blue Shield in the Northern District of California.115  The district court
granted Blue Shield’s motion for summary judgment, finding that “Har-
lick’s Plan unambiguously excluded coverage for residential care.”116  The
court did not reach the question of whether the Parity Act required Blue
Shield to cover Harlick’s residential treatment.117
On August 26, 2011, a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges held that
Blue Shield must provide coverage for a beneficiary’s mental health treat-
113. See id. (explaining plaintiff’s administrative appeals process through
DMHC).  In his investigation of Blue Shield’s denial of Harlick’s care, the Califor-
nia Insurance Commissioner inquired,
(1) [W]hy Harlick had been told that residential care was not medically
necessary; (2) why Harlick was told that benefits would be denied because
care was not pre-authorized, even though the Plan clearly stated that lack
of preauthorization resulted only in a $250 penalty; and (3) whether
Castlewood could be covered as an SNF [skilled nursing facility].
Id.
Although the Insurance Commissioner’s findings did not discuss why
Castlewood could not be considered a skilled nursing facility, the Ninth Circuit
alluded to this inquiry in its opinion. See id. at 704 (noting that Castlewood is
consistently described as “residential” community on its website, and that none of
its staff members are medical doctors or nurses).
114. Id. (alterations in original).
115. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal. Grp. Health Plan, 2010 WL 760484, *5
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010).
116. Harlick, 686 F.3d at 706 (describing district court’s reasoning).  The dis-
trict court also held that Castlewood could not be considered a skilled nursing
facility, which would have been covered under Harlick’s plan. See Harlick, 2010 WL
760484, at *5 (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that Castlewood was skilled nursing facil-
ity).  In its reasoning, the district court noted that Blue Shield defines a skilled
nursing facility as “a facility with a valid license issued by the California Depart-
ment of Health Services as a Skilled Nursing Facility or any similar institution li-
censed under the laws of any other state, territory, or foreign country.” Id.  The
district court looked to Missouri’s definition of a skilled nursing facility. See id.
(analyzing whether definition of skilled nursing facility could fall within Blue
Shield’s covered modalities of treatment).  Because Missouri only defined skilled
nursing facilities in terms of physical illnesses, the court held that “[i]f it is impossi-
ble for Castlewood to be licensed as a SNF in Missouri, then the Court cannot
regard Castlewood as a SNF.” Id. at *6.  The court also noted that, despite Mis-
souri’s limited definition of a skilled nursing facility, Harlick also failed to present
any evidence that Castlewood’s professional staff included nurses. See id. (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that Castlewood was skilled nursing facility for purpose of Blue
Shield coverage).
117. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 706 (reviewing issues resolved by district court).
The district court reasoned that because Castlewood was not a skilled nursing facil-
ity, and thus did not involve any facet of Harlick’s plan that was denied to her, “the
Court d[id] not need to reach Plaintiff’s argument that Harlick’s plan violates the
MHPA [Parity Act].” Harlick, 2010 WL 760484, at *6.
18
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ment at a residential facility, despite the plan’s explicit exclusion of resi-
dential treatment.118  Blue Shield petitioned the Ninth Circuit to set aside
its decision, arguing that the panel misinterpreted the Parity Act to re-
quire all medically necessary services.119  The insurance company asserted
that such a reading of the Parity Act is contradictory to California’s Knox-
Keene Act, which only requires insurers to cover basic services for physical
illnesses.120  The panel rejected Blue Shield’s petition, but withdrew its
opinion and issued a new opinion on June 4, 2012.121
B. Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit held that while residential care was not covered
under Harlick’s plan, California’s Parity Act required Blue Shield to cover
Harlick’s residential care for her anorexia.122  The threshold issue con-
cerned whether there was an abuse of discretion regarding the ERISA plan
118. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 656 F.3d 832, 849–50 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“We therefore conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of the Parity
Act . . . is that plans within the scope of the Act must provide coverage of all
‘medically necessary treatment’ for the nine enumerated ‘severe mental illnesses’
under the same financial terms as those applied to physical illnesses.”), withdrawn
and superseded, 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012).
119. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721 (Smith, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (discussing Blue Shield’s petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing
en banc).  For a full discussion of Judge Smith’s dissent, see infra note 144.
120. See 9th Circuit Upholds Landmark Mental Illness Coverage Ruling: Harlick v.
Blue Shield of Cal., WESTLAW J. INS. COVERAGE (Thompson West) June 15, 2012, 2
(“Blue Shield petitioned for the full 9th Circuit to set aside the panel’s ruling,
arguing for the first time that the regulation[ ] . . . reference[s] California’s Knox-
Keene Act . . . [which] requires that insurers only cover basic services for physical
illnesses, not all medically necessary services . . . .”).
121. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 703 (“This court’s opinion filed on August 26,
2011 . . . is withdrawn and replaced by the attached Opinion and Dissent.”).
122. See id. at 721 (interpreting Parity Act as requiring coverage of all medi-
cally necessary treatment, even if specific treatment is not included in individual’s
plan).  Harlick first claimed, pursuant to her plan’s terms, that if Blue Shield re-
fused to cover residential care, then Blue Shield should still have covered Harlick’s
stay at Castlewood as a “skilled nursing facility,” which was covered under Harlick’s
plan. See id. at 709 (reviewing plaintiff’s arguments against Blue Shield).  The
court reasoned that because Castlewood did not have any medical staff, it could
not qualify as a skilled nursing facility under California or Missouri law. See id. at
709–10 (analyzing whether definition of Castlewood fits within Blue Shield’s cover-
age for skilled nursing facility).  Harlick argued that because California’s licensing
laws included “similar institutions” under its skilled nursing facility category,
Castlewood should be considered a “similar institution.” Id. at 709 (citing CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250(c) (West 2000)).  The court held that “the Plan
covers SNFs in California, as well as institutions in other states that provide around-
the-clock nursing care for physical illnesses, even if they are given a different name
in those states.” Id. at 710.  Because Castlewood lacked medical staff and was re-
ferred to as a residential facility on its website, the court concluded that Blue
Shield did not abuse its discretion in finding that Castlewood was not a skilled
nursing facility. See id.
19
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administrator’s decision to deny Harlick’s benefits.123  The court next ana-
123. See id. at 707 (discussing whether there was abuse of discretion in Blue
Shield’s decision to deny residential care).  The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
determining “whether the plan explicitly grants the administrator discretion to in-
terpret the plan’s terms.” Id. (citing Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d
955, 967 (9th Cir. 2006)).  Here, both parties conceded that discretion was permit-
ted under Harlick’s plan, and the court thus proceeded to review the ERISA plan
administrator’s decision in denying Harlick’s benefits. See id. at 707 (analyzing
whether Blue Shield abused its discretion in denying care for Harlick’s residential
treatment at Castlewood).  The majority opinion emphasized that their review
would be “‘tempered by skepticism’ when the plan administrator has a conflict of
interest in deciding whether to grant or deny benefits.” Id. (quoting Abatie, 458
F.3d at 959).  Such a conflict arises where, as in Harlick, the plan administrator
both reviews coverage decisions and pays for the benefits. See id. (applying conflict
of interest analysis to Blue Shield’s denial of coverage).
The amount of skepticism placed on the plan administrator’s decision differs
based on the severity of the conflict. See id. (describing how various levels of skepti-
cism are applied to insurance plan based on whether conflict of interest is found).
For example, “[t]he conflict is less important when the administrator takes ‘active
steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy,’ such as using an ‘indepen-
dent review process,’ or segregating employees who make coverage decisions from
those who deal with the company’s finances.” Id. (citing Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969
n.7).  Conversely, a conflict is taken more seriously if the plan has a history of bias,
has given inconsistent reasons for denial of care, or has failed to fully review the
denial claim. See id. (enumerating factors that led court to apply more skepticism
to insurance company’s denial of coverage).
Harlick asserted four reasons why the court should apply the skepticism analy-
sis to Blue Shield’s decision. See id.  First, Blue Shield had a conflict of interest
because the company made coverage decisions and paid for such coverage. See id.
(stating plaintiff’s first argument for ERISA abuse of discretion analysis).  In addi-
tion, Blue Shield had offered inconsistent reasons for the denial of Harlick’s care.
See id. (considering plaintiff’s second argument as to why higher level of skepticism
applied to Blue Shield plan).  Besides its inconsistent reasoning, Blue Shield also
did not fully review Harlick’s claims because the company did not offer a reason as
to why the Parity Act did not apply. See id. (noting that Blue Shield’s refusal to give
concrete reason for denial weighed in favor of abuse of discretion).  Lastly, Blue
Shield excluded residential treatment from Harlick’s plan but did not define what
constituted residential treatment. See id. (concluding plaintiff’s four arguments
against Blue Shield in court’s abuse of discretion analysis).
In its review of these four assertions, the court stated that the record did not
indicate “whether Blue Shield has a history of bias in claims administration . . . .”
Id.  The court agreed with Harlick that Blue Shield’s communications with her
were “confusing and frustrating,” though nothing indicated that the changed rea-
sons of denial were done in bad faith. See id. at 708 (rejecting plaintiff’s conten-
tion that Blue Shield’s denial of coverage was due to bad faith).  The court then
rejected Harlick’s claim that Blue Shield did not consider its compliance with the
Parity Act, as one letter to Harlick stated that, “Blue Shield believed that the Act
did not mandate coverage.” Id.  Lastly, the court reasoned that while Blue Shield
did not define residential treatment, “there [wa]s no indication that Blue Shield
exploited any uncertainty about the meaning of ‘residential care.’” Id.  Thus, the
court found two reasons for tempering its review with skepticism: Blue Shield’s
“structural conflict,” and the company’s confusing communications with Harlick.
See id. (weighing factors against Blue Shield in abuse of discretion analysis).  The
court concluded that, despite these reasons, there was no abuse of discretion and,
based on Harlick’s plan alone, residential treatment for anorexia was not required.
See id. at 708 (holding that Harlick’s plan did not require coverage for residential
treatment).
20
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lyzed whether the Parity Act required coverage of residential care, even if
Blue Shield’s plan did not explicitly offer it.124  The court then expanded
its inquiry, and analyzed whether the Parity Act required coverage for all
medically necessary treatments of anorexia.125  Finally, the court applied
its findings and analyzed whether residential care was medically necessary
for Harlick’s treatment.126
1. Does the Parity Act Require Coverage of Residential Care?
The Ninth Circuit noted that subsection (b) of the Parity Act states
that benefits “shall include” outpatient services, inpatient hospital services,
partial hospital services, and prescription drugs if the plan already covers
them.127  While non-exhaustive lists were used in other portions of the
Parity Act, subsection (b) remained ambiguous.128  To resolve this ambi-
guity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the Parity Act’s enforcing regulation,
124. See id. at 712–16 (analyzing whether Parity Act alone compelled Blue
Shield to provide coverage for Harlick).  For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning regarding whether the Parity Act requires coverage of residential treat-
ment, see infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
125. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 714–19 (examining Parity Act).  For a discussion
of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in deciding whether the Parity Act requires insur-
ers to provide all medically necessary treatment for anorexia, see infra notes
132–44 and accompanying text.
126. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 719–21 (considering whether residential care was
medically necessary).  Although Blue Shield did not dispute the medical necessity
of Harlick’s treatment during her administrative appeals process, the company ar-
gued that, “it should be allowed to reopen its administrative process in order to
determine whether Harlick’s residential care was medically necessary.” Id. at 719.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the rule “in this circuit and
in others, is that a court will not allow an ERISA plan administrator to assert a
reason for denial of benefits that it had not given during the administrative pro-
cess.” Id. at 719–20.  During Blue Shield’s communications with Harlick and her
mother, the insurance company never stated that they were denying coverage be-
cause it was not medically necessary; rather, the insurance company repeatedly
stated that coverage was denied because Harlick’s plan did not cover residential
treatment. See id. at 720 (demonstrating that insurance company did not cite med-
ical necessity as reason for Harlick’s coverage denial).  Because the insurance com-
pany did not preserve this issue for appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “Blue
Shield forfeited the ability to assert that defense . . . .” Id. at 721.
127. See id. at 711 (noting benefits Parity Act provides).
128. See id. at 712 (reasoning that subsection (b) remained ambiguous be-
cause of express and specific language in Parity Act’s other provisions).  Subsec-
tion (a) specifically outlined one limitation: coverage must be provided for
“medically necessary treatment of severe mental illnesses.” Id. at 711 (citing CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(a) (West 2003)).  In addition, subsection (c) was
“explicitly characterized as a non-exhaustive list” because it used the language
“shall include, but not be limited to . . . .” Id. at 712 (emphasis added) (citing
§ 1374.72(c)).  Compared to these other statutory provisions, subsection (b) re-
mained ambiguous because it stated “shall include,” but did not indicate whether
the list of care facilities was exhaustive. See id. (citing § 1374.72(b)) (interpreting
Parity Act as non-exhaustive).
21
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which was promulgated by the DMHC in 2003.129  The regulation states
that:
The mental health services required for the diagnosis, and treat-
ment of conditions set forth in Health and Safety Code section
1374.72 [the Parity Act] shall include, when medically necessary,
all health care services required under the Act including, but not
limited to, basic health care services within the meaning of Health
and Safety Code sections 1345(b) [Knox-Keene Act] and 1367(i)
[Knox-Keene Act], and section 1300.67 of Title 28 [relating to
Knox-Keene Act].130
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the regulation’s wording, “including,
but not limited to” justified the court’s holding that subsection (b)’s list of
services was not exhaustive.131
2. Does the Parity Act Require Coverage for All Medically Necessary Treatments
of Anorexia?
In the crux of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit furthered its holding by
stating that the Parity Act obliges insurers to cover not only residential
care, but all medical necessary treatments enumerated in the Parity Act.132
The Ninth Circuit reached its holding by rejecting Blue Shield’s proposed
three-pronged test to determine when a “medically necessary” treatment
must be covered.133  Blue Shield argued that a medically necessary treat-
ment must be covered when the treatment: “(1) is a level of care specified
in subsection (b) of the Parity Act”; (2) “is a ‘basic health care service’”
pursuant to the Knox-Keene Act; or (3) “is an additional (non-mandated)
129. See id. (“[T]he California Department of Managed Health Care . . .
promulgated a regulation implementing the Parity Act in 2003.”).
130. Id. (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.74.72(a) (2003)) (first altera-
tion in original).  Although the regulation did not explicitly refer to the Parity Act
or the Knox-Keene Act, the Ninth Circuit assumed “that the word ‘Act’ refers to
the Knox-Keene Act.” Id. at 714 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.45(a))
(drawing on another regulation of same chapter indicating that “Act” meant Knox-
Keene Act).  The Knox-Keene Act of 1975 defined “basic health care services” as
physician services, hospital inpatient services, diagnostic laboratory, therapeutic
and radiologic care services, home health care, preventive health care, and emer-
gency health care.” See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(b) (2003) (outlining
what is included in basic health care services); see also Harlick, 686 F.3d at 712–13
(noting that regulation’s wording of “including, but not limited to,” suggested that
subsection (b) was intended to be illustrative).
131. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 712–13 (holding that Parity Act’s required modal-
ities of treatment expands beyond inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, par-
tial hospitalization, and prescription drugs).
132. See id. at 719 (“We conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of
the Parity Act and its implementing regulation is that plans within the scope of the
Act must provide coverage of all ‘medically necessary treatment’ for ‘severe mental
illnesses’ under the same financial terms as those applied to physical illnesses.”).
133. See id. at 713–16 (outlining and rejecting Blue Shield’s test establishing
when “medically necessary” treatment would be covered).
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benefit that the plan has chosen to provide for the treatment of” physical
and mental illnesses.134
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the DMHC’s administrative his-
tory in its rejection of Blue Shield’s argument.135  The court reiterated the
regulation’s wording of “including, but not limited to” to justify the inclu-
siveness of all medical treatments.136  Next, the court cited the DMHC’s
“unambiguous[ ] reject[ion]” of a similar argument made by Blue Shield
during the agency’s notice-and-comment process leading up to the regula-
tion’s promulgation.137  In that notice-and-comment process, the DMHC
explicitly noted: “it is sufficient to state that the plans must provide all medically
necessary services. To the extent that certain services are medically necessary, then
those services will be provided.”138
134. See id. at 713 (outlining Blue Shield’s recommended three-prong in-
quiry).  The court cited Blue Shield’s brief, which argued that the Parity Act’s im-
plementing regulation was to be interpreted as stating: “mental health services
required under the Parity Act ‘shall include, when medically necessary, all health
care services required under the [Knox-Keene] Act, including, but not limited to, basic
health care services within the meaning of [the statutory provisions].’” Id. (altera-
tions in original).
135. See id. at 717 (justifying court’s reliance on DMHC’s authority as state
agency).  In relying on the DMHC’s intent in its interpretation of the Parity Act,
the Ninth Circuit noted that California law permits deference to state agencies
when “the subject matter of the statute is especially technical or complex, or if the
agency is interpreting its own regulation.” Id. (citing Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Cal. 1998)).  Moreover, an agency’s in-
terpretation of their rule is most likely to be correct after a notice-and-comment
process, which occurred in the promulgation of the Parity Act’s regulation. See id.
(deferring to agency interpretation of Parity Act).  An agency’s interpretation is
equally credible when the agency has “maintained a consistent interpretation over
time.” Id.
136. See id. at 714 (“Blue Shield plays down the importance of the phrase
‘including but not limited to’ by italicizing the words preceding and following that
phrase.  But the phrase is critical.”).  For the text of Blue Shield’s interpretation of
the Parity Act’s regulation, see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
137. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 714 (explaining Blue Shield’s argument and why
DMHC rejected it).
138. Id. at 715.  Though the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the DMHC’s ad-
ministrative history in supporting its holding, Blue Shield argued that the agency
had interpreted the regulation differently on at least three different occasions. See
id. at 717 (analyzing DMHC’s varying interpretations of Parity Act’s regulation).
First, Blue Shield cited a case “in which DMHC demurred to a complaint seeking
coverage of a medically necessary treatment for autism . . . .” See id. (reviewing
Blue Shield’s claim that DMHC inconsistently interpreted Parity Act regulation).
The court responded by asserting that “[p]ositions taken by an agency for pur-
poses of litigation ordinarily receive little deference under California law.” Id. (cit-
ing Yamaha Corp., 960 P.2d at 1045).  Second, Blue Shield cited a survey conducted
by the DMHC, in which the agency called an insurance company’s lack of residen-
tial coverage a “policy decision.” Id. at 717.  In response to that claim, the court
reasoned that the “DMHC was conducting a survey of residential treatment cover-
age as part of a larger preliminary study of mental health parity.  The study was
not—and was not designed to be—an enforcement proceeding.” Id. at 718.
Lastly, Blue Shield cited a letter written by DMHC’s counsel in response to a com-
plaint from Harlick’s mother. See id. (deciding whether DMHC consistently inter-
23
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Additionally, the court drew on the language of the Parity Act and
reasoned that because the California legislature previously enumerated a
specific exception for plans that carried prescription drugs, the legislature
would have created other exceptions limiting medically necessary treat-
ments.139  Finally, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the third prong of Blue
Shield’s proposed test “lack[ed] support in common sense” because there
are “some medically necessary treatments for severe mental illness [that]
have no analogue in treatments for physical illnesses.”140
The Ninth Circuit then turned to Blue Shield’s contention that be-
cause the regulation’s reference to the word “Act” was assumed to refer to
the Knox-Keene Act, “coverage mandated by the Parity Act for severe
mental illnesses [was] no greater than coverage mandated by the
Knox–Keene Act for physical illnesses.”141  The majority opinion rejected
this argument and found that the Parity Act and the Knox-Keene Act “op-
erate in fundamentally different ways.”142  The court reasoned that
“[b]ecause the Parity Act applies to severe mental illnesses, some of which
are life-threatening, it makes sense that the Act requires insurers to cover
all medically necessary treatments.”143  Conversely, because the Knox-
Keene Act applies to all physical illnesses, “it makes equal sense” that the
legislature would “not require insurers to cover all medically necessary
treatments,” but rather only basic health services.144
preted its Parity Act regulation).  The letter stated, “[a]s Castlewood is licensed as a
residential treatment center, rather than an acute in-patient facility, Blue Shield is
not obligated to provide coverage for this treatment.” Id.  The court rejected Blue
Shield’s contention that this letter shows that the Parity Act does not mandate
coverage for residential treatment, and stated that “Blue Shield misunderstands
the scope of the DMHC’s review” as it was only intended to serve as an indepen-
dent medical review. Id.  An independent medical review, the court stated, “deals
solely with the question whether treatment was medically necessary for a particular
patient,” not whether an insurance company can categorically deny a treatment.
Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(b), (d) (West 2003)).
139. See id. at 715–16 (reasoning that presence of other explicit exceptions
suggests that legislature would have made all subsections equally as explicit if ex-
ception was intended).
140. Id. at 716.
141. See id. at 714.  Although the court agreed with Blue Shield’s assumption
that the regulation referred to the Knox-Keene Act, the court explicitly noted:
“But it does not follow that the coverage for severe mental illnesses mandated by
the Mental Health Parity Act is restricted to the coverage for physical illnesses man-
dated by the Knox–Keene Act.” Id
142. Id. at 716.
143. Id.
144. Id.  Judge Smith opposed the majority’s ruling, emphasizing that the
original opinion’s interpretation of the word “Act” in the regulation to mean “Par-
ity Act,” was the “lynchpin for our conclusion that the Parity Act was not limited by
the provisions of the Knox-Keene Act.” Id. at 721 (Smith, J., dissenting).  Thus, he
asserted that because the majority opinion had changed what “Act” the regulation
was referring to, the holding should have also limited “medically necessary treat-
ments” to those within the scope of the Knox-Keene Act. Id.  Judge Smith offered
both a statutory interpretation argument and a legislative history argument to sup-
24
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V. THE FRAILTY OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK: CAN WE ACHIEVE
PARITY WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE COURTS?
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Harlick has elicited positive feedback
from public health professionals and eating disorder advocates alike.145
The court’s expansion of medically necessary treatment for anorexia has
been trumpeted as the “landmark victory for those suffering from eating
disorders.”146  Moreover, the Harlick holding carries implications for other
mental illnesses included in the Parity Act.147  The court broadly held that
“Blue Shield ‘shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically neces-
sary treatment’ of ‘severe mental illnesses,’ including anorexia nervosa, for
plans coming within the scope of the Act.”148  Thus, the Ninth Circuit did
not limit its holding to residential treatment for anorexia, but rather, in-
terpreted the Parity Act as requiring coverage for all medically necessary
treatment for the statute’s enumerated mental illnesses.149
port his dissent. See id. at 722–27 (disagreeing with majority opinion because of
statutory interpretation and legislative history).
In his statutory interpretation argument, Judge Smith attacked the emphasis
the majority placed on the words “including, but not limited to,” in the Parity Act’s
implementing regulation. Id. at 724.  He noted that California law on statutory
interpretation has held that “while the phrase ‘including, but not limited to,’ is
admittedly a ‘phrase of enlargement,’ this phrase is ‘not a grant of carte blanche
that permits all actions without restriction . . . .” Id.  Moreover, Judge Smith rea-
soned that the regulation’s reference to the Knox-Keene Act shortly after the
phrase “suggests that other non-listed services would similarly be of the type re-
quired under the Knox-Keene Act,” not the Parity Act. Id. at 725.  Judge Smith
further distinguished state case law cited by the majority opinion, including Arce.
See id. at 725.  He clarified that the scope of the court’s analysis in Arce was limited
to an “unequal provision of coverage compared to physical illnesses,” rather than a
discussion of whether the Parity Act requires all medically necessary treatment for
severe mental illnesses. Id. at 726.  In his second argument regarding the Parity
Act’s legislative history, Judge Smith took note of the “elusive” history associated
with the law and argued that the majority opinion’s reliance on legislative history
“results in the proverbial situation where the majority is ‘looking over a crowd and
picking out its friends.’” Id. (quoting People v. Seneca Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 81, 86
(Cal. 2003)).
145. See Pollack, supra note 8, at 1 (reporting on public and stakeholder reac-
tions to Harlick holding).  For a discussion of stakeholder reactions to the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, see infra notes 146–54 and accompanying text.
146. Colliver, supra note 13.
147. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721 (“California’s Mental Health Parity Act pro-
vides that Blue Shield ‘shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically nec-
essary treatment’ of ‘severe mental illnesses,’ including anorexia nervosa, for plans
coming within the scope of the Act.”); see also Parity Act Requires “Medically Necessary”
Coverage, supra note 76 (“The Harlick opinion will compel insurers to conduct med-
ical necessity reviews of proposed treatments for a broad range of mental health
conditions.”).
148. Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721.
149. See id. (holding that Parity Act covers diagnosis and all medically neces-
sary treatment of “severe mental illnesses”); see also Parity Act Requires “Medically
Necessary” Coverage, supra note 76 (“In addition to anorexia nervosa, subsection (d)
of the Parity Act specifies that severe mental illness includes schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness), major depres-
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A. Public Reaction to the Ninth Circuit’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit’s broad holding has led to a divisive debate on the
merits of mental health parity legislation, as well as a court’s ability to en-
force parity if insurers had previously not covered such medically neces-
sary treatments.150  One health economist has supported parity measures,
stating that, “[p]arity seeks a fair approach to allocating treatment re-
sources, so that a patient is not disadvantaged simply because he or she
had the misfortune of being struck by a mental illness.”151  Conversely,
some medical professionals have expressed hesitation towards the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling because of the limited efficacy of controlled treatments,
like residential care.152  In terms of eating disorders, one doctor stated
that the regimented treatment at residential care facilities often leads to
relapse “because patients are often unable to deal with the reduced struc-
ture in their life following discharge.”153  Health policy experts have also
noted that the Harlick ruling “opens a slippery slope that has no natural
limit.”154
However, the Harlick holding should not be interpreted as opening
the floodgates for mental health patients to receive unbridled access to
health care.155  Rather, the Harlick ruling is broad enough to permit
greater access to care, while continuing to limit such care to what is medi-
sive disorders, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive develop-
mental disorder or autism, and bulimia nervosa.”).
150. See Parity Act Requires “Medically Necessary” Coverage, supra note 76 (“Harlick
is not likely to be the last word on the scope of benefits mandated under the Parity
Act.”).  For a discussion on expanding mental health parity legislation through the
courts, see infra notes 158–74 and accompanying text.
151. Richard G. Frank, Parity Is the Fair Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/14/should-insurers-pay-for-
eating-disorders/parity-is-the-fair-approach.
152. See Sally Satel, A Serious Medical Condition, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/14/should-insurers-pay-for-
eating-disorders/anorexia-nervosa-is-a-serious-medical-condition (arguing that res-
idential care may not be most effective care for eating disorder patients “because
patients are often unable to deal with the reduced structure in their life following
discharge”). But see Pollack, supra note 8, at 1 (“[S]ome doctors . . . say that hospi-
talization, which insurers typically cover, might stabilize a patient and restore
weight but does not generally treat the underlying psychological issues.  Outpa-
tient treatment . . . provide[s] counseling but not round the clock.  Residential
treatment, they say, occupies a vital niche between those two.”).
153. See Satel, supra note 152 (explaining limited success of residential treat-
ment center).
154. Michael D. Tanner, Higher Premiums for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/14/should-insurers-
pay-for-eating-disorders/higher-premiums-for-everyone.
155. See Pollack, supra note 8 (“While the ruling applies only to California’s
law, some experts think it will influence courts, state agencies and insurers else-
where.  ‘You’ll see it bleed over,’ said Scott Petersen, a lawyer in Salt Lake City who
often represents insurance companies in parity cases.”).
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cally necessary.156  This ruling not only acknowledges the necessity of indi-
vidualized care for mental health patients, but it also permits doctors to
make decisions regarding their patient’s medically necessary treatment
without the concern that the patient’s insurance company can deny the
treatment.157
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Framework as a Model for Future Parity Policies
Unlike most court decisions regarding parity laws, the Harlick holding
set forth a parity analysis that expanded beyond statutory interpreta-
tion.158  The court offered a unique contribution to mental health parity
analysis by furthering policies that were consistent with the DMHC’s in-
tent.159  Moreover, the court tailored its analysis to the individualized
needs of mental health treatment.160  By employing this framework, the
Harlick case demonstrated that in order to achieve true parity, legislators
and insurance companies must realize that “[s]ome medically necessary
treatments for severe mental illness have no analogue in treatments for
physical illnesses.”161
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit has held that all California insurers
within the scope of the Parity Act must cover all medically necessary treat-
ment for schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major
depressive disorder, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, autism,
156. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 721 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that Blue Shield was required to cover diagnosis and medically necessary
treatment of severe mental illness within scope of Parity Act).
157. See Colliver, supra note 13 (explaining how insurance companies dictate
care).  Colliver interviewed Dr. Neal Anzai, medical director of the eating disor-
ders program at Alta Bates Summit Medical Center in Berkeley, who stated that
“his patients have to be ‘literally on the verge of death’ to get hospitalized and
then their insurance coverage often dictates how much care or what kind of care
comes next.” Id.
158. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721–25 (Smith, J., dissenting) (analyzing lower
federal courts’ statutory interpretation of Parity Act).
159. See id. at 717 (majority opinion) (justifying its deference to DMHC by
noting that “an agency’s interpretation is more likely to be correct when the inter-
pretation has gone through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, when there
are ‘indications of careful consideration by senior agency officials,’ or when the
agency has maintained a consistent interpretation over time”).  Here, the Ninth
Circuit cited the DMHC’s formal notice-and-comment process leading up to the
promulgation of the Parity Act’s regulation. See id. at 714–15 (reviewing adminis-
trative history before promulgation of Parity Act regulation).  In this notice-and-
comment process, the DMHC explicitly rejected Blue Shield’s interpretation of
subsection (b) as exhaustive. See id. at 715 (deferring to agency interpretation of
Parity Act).
160. See id. at 716 (noting that some treatments for mental health illnesses
“have no analogue in treatments” for physical illnesses).  For a discussion of the
individualistic needs associated with mental health care, see infra notes 162–68 and
accompanying text.
161. Harlick, 686 F.3d at 716 (emphasizing distinction between physical and
mental illnesses).
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anorexia, and bulimia.162  This holding is consistent with what the mental
health community already knows: parity laws that only require equality in
certain modalities of treatment, like inpatient and outpatient visits, frus-
trate the clinical community’s understanding that physical and mental ill-
ness often require different treatment.163  Perhaps the largest difference
between physical and mental health care is the individualized care that
most mental health patients need.164  For example, while prescription
drugs may alleviate symptoms of mental illnesses, mental health profes-
sionals recommend a combination of prescriptions with “psychosocial
treatments and support.”165  These psychosocial treatments should be in-
dividualized, as the American Psychological Association recommends
mental health physicians to “adapt or tailor psychotherapy to those spe-
cific patient characteristics in ways found to be demonstrably and probably
effective.”166  This combined treatment of prescription drugs and individ-
ual therapy significantly reduces symptoms and improves the quality of life
for seventy to ninety percent of mental health patients.167  With the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, this combined treatment is now possible for those insured
under California health plans.168
Further, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling provides a solution to the criticism
that legislation is insufficient to solve the inequities in insurance cover-
age.169  Although recent legislation like the Affordable Care Act has
162. See id. (concluding that Parity Act required insurance companies to cover
all medically necessary treatment for enumerated severe mental illnesses).
163. See Gardner, supra note 35, at 687 (noting that “psychopharmalogical
treatment of severe mental illness is rarely an ultimate cure”).
164. See NAT’L UNION OF HEALTHCARE WORKERS, CARE DELAYED, CARE DENIED:
KAISER PERMANENTE’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES 11 (2011), available at http://www.nuhw.org/storage/mental
health/CareDelayedCareDenied.pdf [hereinafter NUHW REPORT] (citing study by
American Psychiatric Association, which recommends individual therapy for
mental health patients).
165. See What Is Mental Illness: Mental Illness Facts, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL
ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=about_mental_illness (last
visited Feb. 21, 2013) (explaining doctor recommendations for mental illnesses).
166. See NUHW REPORT, supra note 164, at 15.
167. See id. (discussing different therapies that aid in mental health recovery);
see also Gardner, supra note 35, at 687 (enumerating recovery rates for several
mental illnesses).  Once an individual with a mental illness can receive medically
necessary treatment, the elimination of symptoms can often be extremely success-
ful. See id. (explaining efficacy of pharmaceutical and therapeutic treatment for
mental health patients).  Gardner notes that whereas the success rate for heart
disease is around forty-five percent, the success rates for mental illnesses are as
follows: sixty-percent for schizophrenic patients; eighty to ninety percent for bipo-
lar patients; seventy to ninety percent for panic disorder patients; seventy five per-
cent for obsessive compulsive patients; and seventy to eighty percent for depressed
patients. See id.
168. See, e.g., Parity Act Requires “Medically Necessary” Coverage, supra note 76
(discussing Ninth Circuit’s broad holding).
169. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 359 (asserting that “[m]ental health parity
may not be an issue that can be solved with legislation”).
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moved closer toward achieving mental health parity on the federal level,
its mandating power remains limited.170  The Affordable Care Act, when
read together with the MHPAEA, requires insurers to provide parity for
mental health, substance abuse, and behavioral health services.171  Al-
though the Affordable Care Act does not preempt state parity laws, the
federal legislation only establishes a minimal set of mandatory
coverage.172
With insurance companies’ reluctance to comply with state parity
laws, as well as the weak mandating power of federal parity legislation, the
courts have given mental health patients a stronger voice by enforcing
state parity laws.173  Outside of California, judicial action has been effec-
tive in New Jersey, where a settlement between Aetna Insurance and its
beneficiaries resulted in the enforcement of a new policy which requires
Aetna to provide coverage for eating disorders in the same manner as
other covered mental illnesses.174
170. See Tovino, supra note 20, at 40–45 (discussing ACA’s implications for
mental health parity); see also Shamash, supra note 27, at 309–15 (discussing impact
of ACA on federal parity laws).  Though the ACA contains provisions that “expand
both mental health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use
disorder benefits,” this expansion is limited by an ACA provision that exempts
health plans that were in effect before March 23, 2010. See Tovino, supra note 20,
at 40–42 (explaining ACA’s significant limitations on health benefit expansions).
Only non-grandfathered health plans, or those that were established after March
23, 2010, are required to offer essential health benefits. See id.
171. See Shamash, supra note 27, at 318 (analyzing cumulative effect of ACA
on federal mental health parity law).
172. See id. (acknowledging limitations to ACA’s scope in context of mental
health parity).
173. See, e.g., Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 721 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that Parity Act required insurance companies to cover medically neces-
sary treatment for severe mental illnesses); Burton v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life &
Health Ins. Co., No. CV 10–09581, 2012 WL 242841, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012)
(holding that despite plan’s exclusion of residential care, plaintiff was entitled to
residential treatment pursuant to Harlick holding).
174. See DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (D.N.J. 2008) (deny-
ing motion to dismiss, which challenged denial of benefits for eating disorder).  In
DeVito, both plaintiffs were the parents of daughters who suffered from eating dis-
orders. See id. at 525 (explaining plaintiffs’ histories with eating disorders).  One
plaintiff was denied treatment after Aetna informed the family that the treatment
was not medically necessary. See id.  Conversely, the other plaintiff was able to re-
ceive treatment, but was later denied coverage after the treatment “exceeded the
contractual limitations for coverage of non-Biological Based Mental Illnesses.” Id.
The district court denied Aetna’s motion for dismissal. Id. at 534.  In June 2008,
Aetna made a $250,000 settlement, agreeing to reimburse one hundred New Jersey
policyholders who were denied coverage related to the diagnosis and treatment of
eating disorders. See McGow, supra note 36, at 597 (discussing Aetna’s settlement
and its implications for increasing access to medically necessary care for eating
disorders).  Courts in New Jersey have enforced similar policies among Aetna’s
competitor insurance companies, such as Horizon and Amerihealth. See Pollack,
supra note 8 (discussing impact of courts’ holdings on parity laws outside of
California).
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VI. THE PROGNOSIS FOR HARLICK: TOTAL PARITY OR
FURTHER COMPLICATIONS?
In 2010, Laura Burton’s husband contacted Blue Shield hoping to
find “approved treatment facilities” for his wife, who had been suffering
from depression and alcohol abuse.175  Unable to receive specific informa-
tion about approved residential treatment facilities from the insurance
company, Laura Burton was admitted to Cottonwood Tucson inpatient
mental health facility.176  Upon admission, Laura was diagnosed with “al-
cohol dependence; major depressive disorder; posttraumatic stress disor-
der; panic disorder with agoraphobia; nicotine dependence; [and]
sedative-hypnotic dependence.”177  Two months later, Blue Shield denied
coverage for Laura’s stay at Cottonwood Tucson.178  Laura appealed the
denial of coverage twice, and was denied both times.179  In its denials,
Blue Shield argued that the Burtons’ plan did not cover residential treat-
ment.180  The insurer also claimed that substance abuse treatment was
only covered insofar as such treatment was used “‘to treat potentially life
threatening symptoms of acute toxicity or acute withdrawal when [the pa-
tient is] admitted through the emergency room.’”181  Such life threaten-
ing symptoms, Blue Shield asserted, were not present in the case of Laura
Burton.182
Prior to Harlick, Laura Burton would have had little legal recourse
after Blue Shield’s internal reviews of her claim.183  However, when Bur-
175. See Burton, 2012 WL 242841, at *2.
176. See id. (describing plaintiff’s treatment at residential facility).
177. Id.
178. See id. at *3 (explaining plaintiff’s communications with Blue Shield).
179. See id. (discussing Blue Shield’s denial of plaintiff’s stay at residential
treatment facility).
180. See id. (noting Blue Shield’s reasoning for denial of care).
181. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Plaintiff’s insurance plan).
182. See id. at *4 (“Although the records indicate that Plaintiff received treat-
ment for alcohol withdrawal symptoms, there is no indication that she entered
Cottonwood Tucson as part of any sort of emergency detoxification program.”).
183. See Jennifer A. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. CV 11–01813, 2012 WL
3996877, at *1 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2012) (holding that, without Parity Act claim,
denial of plaintiff’s residential treatment was not abuse of discretion under ER-
ISA).  In Jennifer A., the plaintiff had “a long history of the eating disorder anorexia
nervosa.” Id. at *3.  After receiving treatment for her anorexia in a partial hospital-
ization program, Jennifer’s insurance company authorized coverage for residential
treatment. See id. at *4 (outlining treatment timeframe).  The insurance company
stopped its authorization of plaintiff’s residential treatment, despite doctors’ obser-
vations that Jennifer had “anxiety around food [and was] resistant to [calorie] in-
crease.” Id. at *5 (alterations in original).  The insurance company justified its
rejection for residential treatment by noting that plaintiff could receive equal
treatment through partial hospitalization. See id.  The plaintiff did not bring suit
under the Parity Act, but rather only challenged the denial of benefits pursuant to
ERISA. See id. at *8 n.11 (“Plaintiff does not challenge the denial of benefits under
California law, for example, under the [Parity Act].”).  Rather, the court applied
an ERISA abuse of discretion analysis with a “low level of skepticism.” Id. at *10.
For an explanation of the Ninth Circuit’s abuse of discretion analysis that the Jen-
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ton sued Blue Shield in January 2012, the district court cited to the initial
Harlick ruling, noting that the Parity Act “may require coverage of treat-
ment that is not within the scope of an actual plan.”184  The court rea-
soned that because two of Burton’s diagnosed illnesses were enumerated
in the Parity Act and her treatment at Cottonwood was “at least in part,
treatment for a severe mental illness,” the treatment fell within the scope
of the Parity Act and Blue Shield was required to cover Laura’s
treatment.185
As seen in Burton v. Blue Shield of California Life and Health Insurance
Co.,186 Harlick has already begun to change the legal landscape of mental
health parity by expanding access to care for mental health patients.187
The Burton court’s holding suggests that lower federal courts are willing to
apply the Ninth Circuit’s Harlick holding.188  While the Harlick precedent
bodes well for all mental health patients in terms of expanding access to
care, an important question remains.189  In applying the Parity Act to all
medically necessary treatments for severe mental illnesses, as Harlick re-
quires, who decides what constitutes medically necessary treatment?190
nifer court applied, see supra note 123.  The court held that, based on the “reasona-
bleness of [the reviewing doctor’s] judgment,” the denial of plaintiff’s benefits was
not an abuse of discretion. Id. at *12; see also Brunalli, supra note 30, at 598 (ex-
plaining courts’ involvement in insurance company’s denial of benefits for plain-
tiff).  Without a state parity claim, as Brunalli explains, “litigation is premised on
the ERISA’s cause of action for the improper denial of benefits under the terms of
an employee benefit plan.” Id.
184. Burton, 2012 WL 242841, at *4.
185. See id. (explaining reasoning behind decision that there was no abuse of
discretion).
186. No. 10-09581, 2012 WL 242841 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012).
187. See Gary Pancer, Ninth Circuit Decision Rules That Residential Treatment for
Anorexia Nervosa Is Covered Under State Mental Health Parity, HEALTHCARE LAW NEWSL.
(Sedgwick Law L.L.P., L.A., Cal.), Sept. 2011, available at http://www.sdma.com/
ninth-circuit-decision-rules-that-residential-treatment-for-anorexia-nervosa-is-cov-
ered-under-state-mental-health-parity-09-07-2011/ (explaining how Ninth Circuit
holding fits into Parity Act jurisprudence).
188. See Burton, 2012 WL 242841, at *5 (“The Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Act to require that insurance companies provide coverage under the same finan-
cial terms and conditions for medically necessary treatment of ‘severe mental ill-
nesses’ and medical conditions.”).
189. See Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 721 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t
appears that inpatient residential treatment was indeed necessary.  But we need
not decide that question.”).  The court noted that because Blue Shield did not
bring the issue up during the administrative process, it had “forfeited the ability to
assert that defense,” and thus the court did not have to determine whether the
treatment was medically necessary. See id.
190. See id. at 719–21 (discussing medical necessity in Harlick’s case).  For a
summary of the Ninth Circuit’s medical necessity analysis, see supra notes 133–38
and accompanying text.  In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit initially noted that
“Blue Shield, as the plan administrator, normally makes the medical necessity de-
termination in the first instance.” Harlick, 686 F.3d at 719 (emphasis added) (citing
Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267, 272–73 (1987)).  Despite the major-
ity’s assertion that they “need not decide” the question of medical necessity, the
court nevertheless looked to Harlick’s doctors’ recommended treatments and con-
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In order for mental health patients to receive lifesaving treatment,
courts should defer to the plaintiff’s doctors in determining whether a
treatment is medically necessary.191  Deference to physicians promotes
Parity Act compliance, as it prevents insurance companies from limiting
coverage.192  Moreover, deference to the mental health clinical commu-
nity is a continuation of the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, and a long-awaited
change to parity analysis.193  For patients like Anna Westin, such change
did not come soon enough.194  But for patients like Jeanene Harlick and
Laura Burton, the Ninth Circuit’s holding reaffirms a mental health pa-
tient’s need for individualized treatment, and provides a cure for the
chronic discrimination that these patients have faced in the courtroom,
and in society.195
cluded that, “it appears that inpatient residential treatment was indeed necessary.”
Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721.  Though the Harlick court initially suggested that the
medical necessity inquiry should be reserved for the ERISA plan administrator, the
majority opinion’s deference to Harlick’s doctors suggests that a court, when view-
ing the record, can draw inferences of medical necessity depending on the doc-
tor’s recommended treatment. See id. (“Given that Harlick’s doctors believed that
outpatient treatment was insufficient, that Harlick entered Castlewood at 65% of
her ideal body weight, and that Harlick needed a feeding tube while at
Castlewood, it appears that inpatient residential treatment was indeed necessary.”).
Id. at 721.
191. See id.
192. See Brunalli, supra note 30, at 594 (explaining that most insurance com-
panies took advantage of minimal state and federal regulation of insurance plans
to “reduce health care costs” by “using health insurance policies with greater re-
strictions and limitations on mental illnesses”).
193. See Colliver, supra note 13 (interviewing Harlick’s attorneys, who stated
that Harlick’s story illustrates “the discrimination insurance companies put on
mental illnesses and the very little understanding they have about eating
disorders”).
194. See Westin, supra note 2 (recounting Anna Westin’s history with anorexia
and her subsequent suicide).  For a further discussion of Anna Westin’s story, see
supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
195. See Harlick, 686 F.3d at 716 (stating that Blue Shield’s argument “lacks
support in common sense” because “it makes no sense in a case such as Harlick’s
to pay for time in a Skilled Nursing Facility—which cannot effectively treat her
anorexia nervosa—but not to pay for time in a residential treatment facility that
specializes in treating eating disorders”); see also NUHW REPORT, supra note 164, at
15 (stating that psychotherapy for mental health patients must “adapt or tailor . . .
those specific patient characteristics in ways found to be demonstrably and proba-
bly effective” (quoting John C. Norcross & Bruce E. Wampold, Evidence-Based Ther-
apy Relationships: Research Conclusions and Clinical Practices, 48 PSYCHOTHERAPY 98
(2011)).
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